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Executive summary
The report reviews available evidence on trans-Mediterranean irregular migration to Europe along 
various routes going back to the 1970s, particularly on the magnitude of the flows, the evolution of 
sea routes to Southern Europe, the characteristics of migrants, the extent to which one can separate 
between economic and forced movements, and mortality during the sea journey. The report also 
reflects on the causes of the so-called migration crisis – a record-high number of undocumented 
arrivals by sea between 2014 and 2016 – and the reasons for the substantial decrease in numbers in 
2017. It concludes by identifying future data and research needs.
More than 2.5 million migrants have crossed the Mediterranean in an unauthorized fashion since 
the 1970s. Irregular sea journeys started rising in those years in response to the introduction of visa 
requirements for people who until then had been exempted – most of them temporary labour migrants 
from North Africa and Turkey – by Western States grappling with rising levels of unemployment during 
the 1973 oil crisis. Such policies: (a) encouraged those who were already in Europe to stay permanently; 
(b) increased regular migration to Europe of their family members; and (c) marked the beginning of 
irregular (labour) migration to Europe and the smuggling business. 
Irregular migration by sea to Europe has occurred along three main routes, which have evolved in 
response to policy measures aimed at curbing such flows: (a) the western route, from Morocco to 
Spain, and (during 2005–2008) between Mauritania, and later Senegal, to the Canary Islands, which 
experienced an increase in numbers in 2014–2017; (b) the central route, from North Africa to Italy 
and (between 1991 and 2001) Albania to Italy, which became particularly significant after the Arab 
revolts in 2010; and (c) the eastern route, mainly from Turkey to Greece, which became prominent 
in 2014–2016, when over a million undocumented migrants landed on the Greek Islands (66% of the 
total arrivals recorded in the same period). 
While arrivals to Greece almost completely stopped after the controversial European Union–Turkey 
statement in March 2016, arrivals to Italy by sea remained relatively high in 2014–2016, compared to 
previous years, and began to subside only in 2017. Cooperation with Turkey to stem irregular flows is 
now being replicated with Libya, the main country of departure of migrants smuggled along the central 
route; however, such an approach is not only morally reprehensible but likely to be unsuccessful, 
given the context of extremely poor governance, instability and political fragmentation in Libya. Also, 
available figures seem to indicate that the majority of migrants in Libya come from Egypt, the Niger, 
Chad and Sudan, which represent a small minority of migrants smuggled by sea to Italy. Despite 
high levels of insecurity, Libya continues to attract migrant workers from neighbouring countries and 
beyond. Some of them may also be refugees, although the refugee status may not be available to them 
given that Libya is not party to the 1951 Convention.  
Europe’s Mediterranean border is by far the world’s deadliest: between 2000 and 2017 (30 June), 
33,761 migrants were reported to have died or gone missing in the Mediterranean during their 
journeys. The highest number of fatalities (5,096) was recorded in 2016, when the short and relatively 
less dangerous route from Turkey to Greece was shut following the European Union–Turkey statement. 
There appears to be a negative correlation between numbers of crossings and probability of dying 
during the journey: the larger the numbers, the lower the probability of dying; in other terms, the 
higher the probability to arrive safely at destination. Stopping migration and eradicating deaths at 
sea may therefore be partly conflicting objectives. Shutting the shorter and less dangerous routes can 
open longer and more dangerous routes, thus increasing the likelihood of dying at sea. 
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Irregular sea crossings along the eastern route is mainly linked to the refugee crisis affecting the Arab 
countries, while journeys along the central route derive from more structural migratory pressures 
in sub-Saharan Africa. For most of the asylum seekers travelling along the eastern route, irregular 
and dangerous journeys by sea and smuggling services were the only options available, given the de 
facto absence of regular pathways existing in European law, such as humanitarian visas. A comparison 
of irregular arrivals by sea to Greece and Italy between 2009 and 2016 with first residence permits 
granted in the EU-28 during the same period shows that irregular arrivals are higher than first permits 
issued only for four major refugee source countries, while first permits are more numerous than 
irregular crossings for all African nationals (with the exception of Eritrea). 
The number of migrants who could qualify for refugee status among those who arrived in Greece and 
Italy by sea over the past three years can be estimated based on migrants’ nationalities (recorded by 
national authorities), and rate of positive decisions on asylum claims lodged in the EU-28, by nationality 
of the claimant (from Eurostat). Based on this analysis, refugees constituted the majority of migrants 
who arrived by sea to Greece in 2009–2016, but only in 2013–2014 in Italy. The proportion increased 
in both countries in 2011–2014, reaching a plateau in Greece and steadily decreasing in Italy. This 
does not imply that all these individuals actually received refugee status in European countries, nor 
that individuals from other countries may not have qualified for and received such a status. Moreover, 
interviews with a large sample of migrants in Italy in 2016 show that the majority mentioned conflict, 
insecurity and persecution as reasons for having left their countries. 
At any rate, the common distinction between migrants and refugees is inappropriate, both in theory 
and in practice, in the context of Mediterranean migration. Anyone deciding to risk one’s life on a 
flimsy boat across the Mediterranean has imperative reasons for doing so, and such decisions often 
result from despair for the situation in countries of origin – be it for reasons of poor livelihood and 
lack of prospects, violence and conflict or a combination of those – and hope for a better future. 
Even asylum seekers from conflict-torn countries arriving in Greece or Italy did not lodge their claims 
in these countries but continued the journey to destinations that they thought would offer better 
opportunities. 
The report notes the limitations of available data on irregular migration, a phenomenon that is 
by nature hard to measure. Figures of recorded undocumented migrant flows are inevitably an 
underestimate of the total number of migrants crossing the Mediterranean irregularly, as only 
migrants who are apprehended – upon entry or during their stay – are counted. Moreover, an 
increase in the figures does not necessarily reflect an increase in irregular flows, but may derive 
from expanded border control measures. For instance, the increase in search-and-rescue operations 
in the Mediterranean since the introduction of Mare Nostrum in October 2013 may have had an 
impact on numbers due to the higher probability of intercepting and counting migrants, compared 
to previous years. 
Very little is known about migrants’ characteristics, except for basic information on sex, country 
of (declared) nationality and whether the person is an adult or minor. This information may not be 
representative, given the unknown number of people who remain uncounted. Numbers of deaths at 
sea may also grossly underestimate the real number of people who die or go missing while crossing 
the Mediterranean, as they are based on numbers of bodies found and survivors’ testimonies. An 
increase in sea patrol operations in the Mediterranean may have led to an increase in numbers of 
recorded fatalities, given bodies are more likely to be found and survivors to be apprehended and 
interviewed. 
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More data should be collected, better organized and disseminated to fill these gaps in knowledge 
and inform more effective and sustainable policy responses; at the same time, new conceptual 
frameworks should be developed to allow to put those numbers in context. Information that is 
regularly collected by national authorities on migrants’ profiles, reasons, experiences and future plans 
should be systematically organized and made public. Ad hoc surveys should be conducted with migrants 
in various circumstances, from those detained and about to be returned, to those successfully settled 
at destination. 
Data already collected by different national administrations should be collated, harmonized and 
processed to allow for a measurement of impact of government policies in both the short and the 
longer term. Research is also needed on how the European Union–Turkey statement has affected the 
situation of migrants waiting to travel to Europe, and how cooperation with Libya is affecting migrants 
stranded in the country.
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1. Introduction
In mid-September 2017, the Mediterranean migration crisis was clearly receding.  Since the beginning 
of the year, “only” 130,000 migrants had been recorded at arrival by sea with no visa in Italy, 
Greece, Spain, Malta and Cyprus. Though 2017 is still not finished, the total annual number of cross-
Mediterranean migrants would most probably not reach the peaks recorded in previous years: 368,080 
in 2016, 908,558 in 2015 and 209,662 in 2014.1 
The end of the “crisis”, a term to be understood as the sudden deterioration of a chronic situation, 
does not mean the end of irregular migration and its causes, nor of the circumstances that made 
migratory pressures paroxysmal. But subsiding numbers open a window for reflecting on what 
happened. What did cause such a crisis? How did political circumstances that generate movements 
of refugees interplay with demographic and economic factors that represent a long-term structural 
shift? How did political responses along migratory routes impact the problems? How did the crisis 
call into question the governance of migration and refugee movements at local, national and global 
levels? How can democratic States reconcile two of their founding duties, protecting their citizens and 
defending universal values? 
Moreover, a reflection is needed on why the crisis receded. Is it because migrants were stopped before 
departure, whether by virtue of official agreements (Turkey–European Union) or as a result of unofficial 
deals (Libya–Italy)? Would it instead be that candidates became fewer, in countries of origin or transit? 
Would it then be a shift in the circumstances that generate refugee movements in European Union’s 
vicinity, with no corresponding change in the structural factors of economic migration? 
Time has arrived to reflect on what could happen next. What are the deep movements below the 
surface? While recent flows of unauthorized migration across the Mediterranean are in direct 
continuation of an old trend, they are unprecedented in several regards: (a) their magnitude; 
(b) the media coverage they receive; (c) the attention they draw from international organizations and 
non-governmental organizations; (d) the way they put in question international law on refugees and 
migrants; and (e) the inability of the European Union to control its external sea border and its reliance 
on States from where migrants boarded. 
Finally, three remarks must be made, one on the geographic area covered by the paper and two on the 
terminology it uses. 
• Geographic coverage: This paper concentrates on the Mediterranean Sea. It does not look at 
the whole journey of migrants, neither between their place of origin and the spot from where 
they embark, nor between their point of disembarkation and the place they will eventually 
reach further away in Europe.
• Refugees versus migrants: The distinction commonly found in official or media reports between 
migrants and refugees is a wrong dichotomy. Indeed, refugees are migrants. International 
migration is defined by border crossing (followed by an effective, or intended, duration of stay of 
at least one year according to the official UN definition).2   In any country, international migrants 
are therefore born-abroad persons, and foreign citizens unless they are granted the nationality 
of their destination country. Defined as persons “outside the country of their nationality”, 
most from the 1951 Convention, or the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, refugees were born in their country of nationality and are international migrants in 
1 Unless stated otherwise, numbers of arrivals at sea are those provided by the International Organization for Migration (IOM): see http://
iom.maps.arcgis.com/apps/MapAndAppGallery/index.html?appid=3af3e9630ab849e99e6970a29aa25ff5 
2 A migrant is defined “as any person who changes his or her country of usual residence. A person’s country of usual residence is that in 
which the person (…) normally spends the daily period of rest” (United Nations (1998), Recommendations on Statistics of International 
Migration, Revision 1, p.17).
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their country of asylum.3 The true distinction referring to the motives behind the cross-border 
movement is between migrant workers (and their family dependants), also commonly referred 
to as “economic migrants”, and refugees. And even that distinction is in practice very difficult 
to make, given that the same individual needs – at the same time – international protection 
and to earn a livelihood. Most cross-Mediterranean migrants have indeed mixed reasons for 
migrating. 
• Irregular is the act of migration, not the migrant: Media stories and political statements often 
refer to “irregular migrants”, “unauthorized migrants” or “illegal migrants”. One should not miss 
their implicit meaning, which is that migrants whose entry or stay breaches a host country’s 
laws are negated as persons. Persons cannot be irregular, unauthorized or illegal. Only their 
action and their situation can. This paper will therefore use the following terms: irregular 
migration/entry or unauthorized migration/entry, but refer to migrants as “undocumented” or 
“in an irregular situation”. 
The paper will successively review the state of knowledge about cross-Mediterranean flows of 
migration, their (relatively short) history in the western, central and eastern routes, mortality during 
the journey by sea, the (often misleading) distinction between economic migrants and refugees, and 
the situation in Turkey and Libya from where most migrants embark, to finally suggest ways for a better 
understanding of the issue.
3 But some of them are not (e.g. those sons and daughters of refugees born in exile; youngest age groups of populations in protracted 
refugee situations and others).
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2.  How much is known about    
trans-Mediterranean undocumented 
migration to Europe?
Observing a phenomenon that by essence eludes normal procedures of administrative recording is 
like squaring the circle. From the most elementary question (How many? When? Where?) to more 
elaborated ones (What profiles? What processes?), analysis must rely on data that are always 
incomplete and often biased, therefore to be taken with much caution. 
2.1.  Flows
Migrants are normally counted at entry by border police in charge of controlling passports. The problem 
with counting undocumented migrants – defined as migrants with no passport or with no entry visa 
on their passport – is that they precisely try to escape police control for fear of being arrested and 
sent back to their place of departure. They are recorded by the police only if they are apprehended, 
which can happen either as soon as they arrive, later during their stay or never. By nature, numbers 
of recorded undocumented migrants are an underestimate of total flows of undocumented migrants. 
Moreover, underestimation varies according to place and time. Differences across countries hamper 
international comparisons.  Variation according to time is a source of bias when it comes to assessing 
trends. An observed increase (or decrease) in flows of recorded irregular migration can reflect a real 
trend in migration, but also a change in public authorities’ ability to control borders. The more efficient 
the shore and sea control by the police and navy, the higher the probability for undocumented migrants 
to be apprehended and therefore counted. 
In this regard, the systematic search and rescue at high sea launched in October 2013 by Italy and 
never discontinued since then may well have introduced a breaking point in the statistics. While Mare 
Nostrum and subsequent operations in the Mediterranean were decided in response to alarming 
increases in the numbers of migrants entering Italy and Greece by sea or drowning during the crossing, 
one cannot rule out that they further impacted the numbers themselves. Not only because operations 
at high sea would have (as alleged by many though never established) incited more migrants to risk the 
journey in the hope they would be rescued and safely brought to Europe, but also because they have 
extended the administrative coverage of undocumented migration. 
2.2.  Deaths at sea
Deaths at sea are not directly recorded unless bodies are found. No mechanism of systematic, direct 
recording can be put in place for counting drowned persons as individual identities and numbers of 
people boarding the boat were not registered at departure. Statistical series of dead and missing 
migrants can be drawn from reports compiled separately by Italian blogger Gabriele Del Grande (back 
to 1988),4 the European network UNITED for Intercultural Action (back to 1993),5 and the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) since 2014, which are the three most reliable and consistent sources.6 
In all three sources, most reports are those of survivors when apprehended by the police, and/
or interviewed by the media or humanitarian workers.7 The probability for a death to be reported 
therefore grows with the probability for a surviving migrant to be apprehended and counted. The 
4 Fortress Europe, available from http://fortresseurope.blogspot.it/
5 See www.unitedagainstracism.org 
6 Missing Migrants Project, available from https://missingmigrants.iom.int 
7 Most dead and missing data in the Central Mediterranean comes from IOM Italy’s interviews with survivors and reports from the Libyan 
Red Crescent.
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more high sea is patrolled, the more likely are survivors to be interviewed about dead and missing 
persons among fellow travellers. Reports, in general, do not provide individual cases of well-identified 
deaths but rounded estimates of numbers of migrants drowned in the course of a sinking. Moreover, 
when there are no survivors and the sinking has remained unnoticed, all the involved deaths will most 
likely remain ignored.8 
2.3.  Characteristics of migrants
The circumstances in which smuggled migrants are registered at arrival restrict to the minimum the list 
of individual characteristics collected at the time of registration: at best, sex, broad age group (minors/ 
adults) and country of (declared) nationality. They provide an imperfect picture of the reality, as it is 
not known how many  people remain uncounted and whether they have the same distribution by age, 
sex and nationality as those who could be counted.
More detailed characteristics can be known through the few sample surveys conducted in specific 
locations among migrant populations arrived by sea.9  But surveys have their own biases. As soon as 
interviewed persons do not feel confident in their likelihood to be admitted in, their responses can be 
determined by the fear of being sent back. Because lodging a claim for asylum gives a few months’ 
respite until the claim is processed, migrants may use this channel to increase their probability to 
be legally admitted, and their responses may be inspired by their knowledge of what will make their 
asylum claim most plausible. Responses to surveys would somehow anticipate those to be given to 
administrative questionnaires allowing refugee-status determination.
8 For a detailed analysis, see T. Last and T. Spijkerboer, “Tracking deaths in the Mediterranean” in: T. Brian and F. Laczko (eds.), Fatal 
Journeys: Tracking Lives Lost during Migration (IOM, Geneva, 2014), pp. 85–107, available from https://publications.iom.int/system/
files/pdf/fataljourneys_countingtheuncounted.pdf. See also S. Grant, “Identification and tracing” in: T. Brian and F. Laczko (eds.), Fatal 
Journeys volume 2: Identification and Tracing of Dead and Missing Migrants (IOM, Geneva, 2016), pp. 31–73, available from http://
publications.iom.int/books/fatal-journeys-volume-2-identification-and-tracing-dead-and-missing-migrants 
9 For example, L. Achilli et al., Study on Migrants’ Profiles, Drivers of Migration and Migratory Trends (IOM, Rome, 2016). Available from 
www.italy.iom.int/sites/default/files/news-documents/Migrants%20Study%20-%20FINAL%20ENG%20VERSION%20-%20ELEC.pdf
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3.  Changing sea routes to Southern Europe
“Another huge wave of migrants washed onto Italy’s shores on Thursday seeking an economic haven, 
but instead finding edgy police officers and a hard-line Government determined to send them back 
home.”10 This was not at the peak of the Mediterranean migration crisis in the summer 2015, but 
24 years earlier after 15,000 undocumented migrants disembarked overnight at the Italian port of Bari 
from the Vlora vessel, a cargo boat chartered in Albania. The Vlora epic was shortly following another 
massive movement of arrivals by sea when an estimated 27,000 Albanians landed with no visa on the 
shore of Brindisi within three days in March of the same year, in what remains until today the largest-
ever single wave of cross-Mediterranean irregular migration.
The Albanian story brings some insights into the Mediterranean migration crisis that recurrently makes 
the front pages since 2015. First, were those fleeing Albania refugees, migrant workers or both at 
the same time? Indeed, Albania’s democratization that came after 45 years of authoritarianism and 
isolation from the rest of the world caused havoc to the economy and at the same time created the 
fear of retaliation among supporters of the fallen regime.11 Second, who apart from historians and 
the protagonists themselves remembers the Vlora episode? Indeed, with the passing of time, the 
boat people from Albania have either become ordinary residents of Italy, or continued the journey or 
returned to their homes. 
In 1991, irregular landings were novelty for Italy but not for Spain. For a decade at least, every now 
and then, fishermen or walkers would discover corpses washed up on the beaches of Andalusia. They 
would barely notice the vast majority of migrants who had successfully crossed the Strait of Gibraltar 
and continued the journey towards the north. So what happened that explains the rise of irregular 
trans-Mediterranean migration? 
It is common sense to state that illegality is a product of how legality is defined and the law enforced, 
and this applies to migration just as to any other phenomenon. Migrants crossing the Mediterranean 
Sea from south to north at the risk of their lives did not make a significant appearance until the 
1970s when, one after the other, Western European States shut the door to legal labour migration by 
imposing visas on people until then exempted, and sparingly delivering the new visas. The context was 
an economic crisis triggered by a fourfold increase in oil prices in the few months following the Arab–
Israeli war of October 1973. Unemployment was hitting industrial nations for the first time since World 
War II. In reaction, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and other States terminated bilateral 
agreements regulating the circulation of migrant workers from North Africa and Turkey.12 This shift in 
policy produced two consequences. 
First, for fear of not being allowed to re-enter in the future, seasonal migrant workers employed in 
Europe decided not to return home (even if they had to overstay a visa), but to call in their wives and 
children who could be admitted in application of European laws on family reunification.  The circular 
migration of male workers would gradually give way to the permanent immigration of mostly inactive 
family dependants and the subsequent establishment of populations with a migrant background. The 
second consequence was that trans-Mediterranean labour migration continued but in an irregular 
manner, at which time clandestine migration and the smuggling business commenced.13 
10 C. Haberman, “Italy moves to stem wave of Albanians”, New York Times, 9 August 1991. Available from www.nytimes.com/1991/08/09/
world/italy-moves-to-stem-wave-of-albanians.html
11 Council of Europe, Report on the exodus of Albanian nationals, Doc. 6555, 27 January 1992. Available from https://assembly.coe.int/nw/
xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewHTML.asp?FileID=6888&lang=EN
12 Morocco, for example, had signed bilateral agreements for the recruitment of low-skilled workers with Germany (1963), France (1963), 
Belgium (1964) and the Netherlands (1969). 
13 See for example S. Collinson, Shore to Shore: The Politics of Migration in Euro-Maghreb Relations (London, Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 1996), pp. 7–38; P. Fargues, “Arab migration to Europe: Trends and policies”, International Migration Review, 38(4):1348–71 
(Winter 2004).
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Figure 1. Unauthorized entries by sea into Europe as recorded by police authorities, 1998–2017
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         Source:    Table A.1. in Appendix, Italian Ministry of the Interior, 2017.
Since the 1970s, more than 2.5 million migrants (2,367,821 were recorded between 1 January 1998 
and 12 September 2017) have crossed the Mediterranean Sea to enter Europe with no visa. They have 
travelled from south to north and east to west along three main routes.
3.1.  The western route
The first south-to-north route of cross-Mediterranean unauthorized migration was the shortest 
possible, from the shore of Tangier in Morocco to that of Algeciras in Spain a few miles away. Migrants 
would cross the less than 15 km Strait of Gibraltar using small rubber dinghies or hiding under trucks 
ferried from Morocco to Spain. They would then either vanish on the roads of Spain, or be temporarily 
detained until an amnesty regularized their situation. Others would be sent back to Morocco, but 
forced return of apprehended migrants was not systematic for lack of clarity on the readmission of 
migrants in irregular situation, with Morocco refusing to readmit those who were not its citizens.14
In an attempt to curb the trend, Spain adopted, in 1991, a more restrictive migration policy imposing for 
the first time a visa on citizens from Maghreb states. As many were not eligible for the visa, clandestine 
migration started to gain momentum. The first statistics dates back to 1999 and shows a rapid increase 
in recorded irregular crossings through the Strait of Gibraltar, from less than 5,000 in 1999 to close 
to 20,000 in 2003 (Table A.1.). The Integrated System of External Vigilance in Spain – created in 1999 
in order to control unauthorized migration from Morocco15 – could not alone stem the flow, unless 
Morocco would take action to stop irregular migration at departure. 
14 A readmission agreement (Agreement on the movement of people, the transit and the readmission of foreigners who have entered 
illegally) between Morocco and Spain was only signed in 1992 and did not enter into force until 2012.
15 J. Carling, “Migration control and migrant fatalities at the Spanish-African borders”, International Migration Review, 41(2):316–343 
(2007).
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And this is what Morocco did in 2003, with a new law criminalizing the exit of undocumented migrants 
and heavily penalizing both the migrants and those involved in facilitating their travel.16 Two years later 
the law was enacted, the short route across the Strait of Gibraltar seemed almost shut. But irregular 
migration from Morocco to Spain did not necessarily stop. It simply got around the surveillance system 
and took a longer, more perilous route. In the first place, migrants diversified points of embarkation 
and disembarkation. However, surveillance extended and a new migration route opened, linking 
Mauritania, then Senegal to the Canary Islands more than 1,000 km away. 
Between 2006 and 2008, around 50,000 migrants embarked on small Senegalese fishing boats towards 
the Canary Islands, with a high risk of dying at high sea (see section 4 below). The Canary Islands 
route opened as suddenly as it closed in 2008, as a result of harsh policies at both ends: search and 
push back at high sea by Spain, control of the shores by Mauritania and Senegal, and readmission 
agreements signed with Spain. Civil society also played a role by drawing attention on the extreme 
dangers of the crossing.
During almost six years, migration through the western route remained at low ebb, until a surge started 
in mid-August 2014 and continued through 2017. Spain, to a lesser extent than Italy and, above all, 
Greece, became again a destination during the migration “crisis”.
3.2.  The central route
The Italian shore, in the centre of the Mediterranean Sea, has been an entry point in Europe for 
migrants arriving from all the countries bordering the sea, from Tunisia to Turkey. From 1991 through 
2001, the channel of Otranto, the shortest sea route to Italy, was also the most travelled. Italy is only 
40 miles from Albania and can be reached in a few hours. An estimated 150,000 to 250,000 third-
country nationals, a majority of them Albanians, made the travel. Numbers of arrivals peaked three 
times: (a) in 1991, when Italy recognized Albanians as prima facie refugees; (b) in 1997, when Albania 
was gripped by unrest and rebellion; and (c) in 1998–1999, during the conflict in UNSC resolution 
1244-administered Kosovo.17 When the criminal organizations controlling the route were dismantled 
in 2002, migrant flows across the Otranto Channel almost stopped.18
The Channel of Sicily has always been a route to Italy, with the islands of Lampedusa and Pantelleria 
reachable by boat in one day from Tunisia, and two to three days from Libya. Once the Channel of 
Otranto passed under the full control of the Italian navy, these two islands, as well as the more distant 
regions of Sicily and Puglia, became a much sought-after destination. From 2003 to 2010, most of the 
280,000 undocumented migrants arrived by sea in Italy (Table A.1.), entering through the Channel of 
Sicily. Many would have departed from Tunisia, though it became more difficult after Tunisia adopted 
a legislation criminalizing irregular exit similar to that of Morocco,19 and was later followed by Algeria.20 
It is at that time that Libya, which was then a major country of immigration hosting anything between 
1 and 2 million migrant workers from the neighbouring countries and further away in sub-Saharan 
16 Loi n° 02-03 du 11 novembre 2003 relative à l'entrée et au séjour des étrangers au Royaume du Maroc, à l'émigration et l'immigration 
irrégulières. Article 50 prescribes heavy sentences: up to one year imprisonment for the migrant and up to five years for those facilitating 
the irregular exit, and life sentence in case of death of the migrant. It must be noted that the new law was much debated, opposing 
human rights activists for whom it was not helping to tackle the root causes of migration in sub-Saharan Africa but marginalizing 
migrants in irregular situation and potentially exacerbating humanitarian problems, to those defending that it was a first step towards a 
truly Moroccan policy on migration. The amnesty campaign in Morocco that regularized the vast majority of undocumented migrants in 
2015 would eventually support the defenders of the law.
17 Hereinafter referred to as Kosovo/UNSC 1244.
18 F. Pastore, P. Monzini and G. Sciortino, “Schengen’s soft underbelly? Irregular migration and human smuggling across land and sea 
borders to Italy”, International Migration, 44 (4):95–119 (2006).
19 Loi organique n° 2004-6 du 3 février 2004, modifiant et complétant la loi n° 75-40 du 14 mai 1975, relative aux passeports et aux 
documents de voyage. Article 39 prescribes a 4-year sentence for anyone accommodating migrants in irregular situation, and a 5- to 
15-year sentence for those involved in the smuggling process. 
20 République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Ministère de l'Intérieur et des Collectivités Locales Loi 08-11 du 25 juin 2008 relative 
aux conditions d’entrée, de séjour et de circulation des étrangers en Algérie. www.interieur.gov.dz/index.php/fr/le-ministere/le-
minist%C3%A8re/textes-legislatifs-et-reglementaires/59-les-etrangers-et-les-conventions-consulaires/500-loi-08-11-du-25-juin-2008-
relative-aux-conditions-d%E2%80%99entr%C3%A9e,-de-s%C3%A9jour-et-de-circulation-des-%C3%A9trangers-en-alg%C3%A9rie.html 
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Africa, became a hub for cross-Mediterranean journeys, and controlling its shore a bargaining chip in 
the hands of Colonel Gadhafi at the negotiating table with Italy and the European Union.21 
Arab revolts starting in December 2010 soon provoked a surge in irregular cross-Mediterranean 
migration to Europe. Just after the revolution broke out in both countries, Tunisia and Libya became 
points of departure for migrants smuggled into Italy. In 2011 alone, 62,692 undocumented migrants 
entered Italy by sea, compared with 4,406 and 9,573 respectively in 2010 and 2009. Most crossings 
took place in the Spring 2011, when police forces were disorganized and coastal control was inexistent 
in Tunisia, a fact which suggests that part of the 28,047 Tunisian migrants recorded at entry with no 
visa in Italy in 2011 decided to cross in response to an opportunity (no border control) more than 
a structural change (the revolution) that was just starting at that time. Moreover, undocumented 
migrants who would otherwise have taken the western route seized the same opportunity. Revolution 
in Tunisia would have, therefore, rerouted existing flows of irregular migration more than stimulated 
new ones. This interpretation is supported by smaller numbers of arrivals in 2012 (13,267) and 2013 
(42,925). 
It is later, starting from 2014, that the migration “crisis” could be felt in Italy, with annual numbers of 
entries by sea jumping to four times their level in 2013 for three consecutive years, and beginning to 
subside only in 2017. As will be seen in section 5, the surge in irregular migration to Italy is not linked 
to the massive refugee crisis affecting the Arab countries as much as to migratory pressures in sub-
Saharan Africa.
3.3.  The eastern route
In the three years between 2014 and 2016, Greece alone received 1,047,939 undocumented migrants 
by sea, representing 66 per cent of the 1,582,759 sea arrivals recorded in the whole Mediterranean 
Europe during the same period. From a European perspective, the “Mediterranean migration crisis” 
was, in the first instance, a Greek crisis. Massive movements of sea arrivals to Greece are neatly 
bounded by two turning points, however: (a) completion of the fence barring the River Evros, marking 
the land border between Greece and Turkey in December 2012; and (b) the European Union–Turkey 
statement in March 2016.  
Greece had been an entry point to Europe for undocumented migrants and refugees since it became 
a member of the European Union in 1981, but they were all taking the simplest, shortest and safest 
route, which is by land. Turkey is indeed one of the most accessible countries in the world,22 and a 
hub for nationals from a variety of distant countries trying to reach Europe with no visa through its 
land border with Greece.23 In the year 2011 alone, around 55,000 migrants were detected crossing 
the river.24 The fence was decided with an aim to stop the growing flow. Since the beginning, its 
construction was a matter of controversy. It was anticipated that it would not stop irregular migration 
as much as shift it towards a sea route, thereby strengthening the smuggling business. And this is 
actually what happened. As noted at that time, the fence didn’t work because it was impassable; it 
“worked” because it was more difficult to cross than the alternative routes.
As soon as the land border shut, undocumented migrants started being smuggled by sea to the Greek 
Islands, a few miles west of Turkey. The flow started to grow in June 2014 (6,214 recorded arrivals), 
continued until October 2014 (11,628 arrivals) and took enormous momentum the following year to 
reach a peak of 217,936 in October 2015, which is more than 7,000 on an average day. Figure 2 clearly 
shows that Syrians initiated the movement and were followed a few months later by Afghans, then by 
21 S. Hamood, African Transit Migration through Libya to Europe: The Human Cost (Forced Migration and Refugee Studies Program, The 
American University in Cairo, 2006) and United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, World Refugee Survey 2007.
22 Nationals of 78 countries are visa-exempt in Turkey, and nationals of 42 additional countries are eligible for a visa at entry.
23 See A. Içduygu, The Irregular Migration Corridor between the EU and Turkey: Is it Possible to Block it with a Readmission Agreement? 
(Migration Policy Centre, EU-US Immigration Systems n. 2011/14) (2011), available from http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/17844. 
See also A. Içduygu and K. Kirişci (eds.), Land of Diverse Migrations: Challenges of Emigration and Immigration in Turkey (Istanbul Bilgi 
University Press, Istanbul, 2009).
24 N. Nielsen, “Fortress Europe: a Greek wall close up”, EUObserver, 21 December 2012. Available from https://euobserver.com/fortress-
eu/118565 
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Iraqis and a few other nationalities. As will be discussed in section 5, asylum seekers comprised the 
overwhelming majority of the massive waves of migration by sea to Greece. 
Figure 2. Monthly arrivals by sea in Greece from 1 January 2014 to 1 December 2015 – Top five nationalities
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                     Source:     Greek Police authorities, see Table A.2. in the Appendix, 2016.
Arrivals by sea to Greece stopped as abruptly as they had started, just in a few weeks. In March 2016, a 
statement on migration was made between the European Union and Turkey, according to which Turkey 
would stop undocumented migrants embarking to Greece in exchange of a visa liberalization regime for 
its citizens and financial compensation.25 The agreement has been hailed by some for the 97 per cent 
drop in irregular migration it produced, but viewed with deep concern by others for its infringing on 
human rights and refugee law, and for Europe renouncing its founding ethics of protection.
Reflecting on developments along the three cross-Mediterranean routes – to Spain, Italy and Greece – 
two fundamental questions can be raised. 
First, can walls erected on the route of migrants work? On the contrary, closing a route seems to 
amount to immediately opening an alternative route, often longer and more perilous, and fostering 
the proliferation of smuggling networks. This was certainly the case when the route through the Strait 
of Gibraltar was replaced by the longest possible journey from Western Africa to the Canary Islands. 
But no comparable shift occurred when Turkey barred the route to the Greek Islands. An increase in 
the number of boats chartered from Libya indeed followed, but a closer look at nationalities shows 
that migrants travelling the Central Mediterranean route since the spring 2016 are not those blocked 
in Turkey (see section 5). 
Second, which are the countries effectively controlling a route: those from where migrants embark 
or those where they intend to disembark? The European Union and some of its Member States 
subcontracting the control of migration and refugee movements to countries with poor human rights 
records, authoritarian or failed regimes or even countries left to the mercy of militias, is a particularly 
worrying issue.26
25 See European Commission, EU-Turkey Statement: One year on (n.d.). Available from https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/
homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/eu_turkey_statement_17032017_
en.pdf
26 See for example, Refugees International’s blog post, “The anniversary of the EU-Turkey Statement”: “The EU should not use the EU-
Turkey statement as a blueprint for its cooperation with other countries, particularly with Libya, where severe and widespread abuses 
against asylum seekers and migrants have been documented (www.refugeesinternational.org/blog/eu-turkey-agreement).
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4. Europe’s Mediterranean shore, the 
world’s most lethal border
“Unprecedented” is the most often-used qualifier in media reports on the Mediterranean migration 
crisis. While this crisis was unprecedented in many ways, from staggering numbers of both arrivals by 
sea and asylum claims lodged in Europe to the failure of policy instruments, it must be remembered 
that what makes this crisis unique is in the first instance an all-time high in mortality at sea. From 2000 
to 2017 (30 June), 33,761 migrants drowned in the Mediterranean Sea trying to reach Europe, making 
Europe’s Mediterranean border by far the world’s deadliest, based on available information.27 
As shown by Figure 3.1., it is in 2016 – the year when, at the request of the European Union, Turkey 
closed the shortest and less risky way, and the longest and most perilous route joining Turkey or even 
Egypt to Italy became the most travelled – that the highest number of deaths was recorded with as 
much as 5,096 persons estimated to have drowned.  Other peaks were recorded in 2007, when the 
Canary Islands became the only destination reachable in Spain, and in 2011, the year of uprisings in 
Tunisia and Libya.
Absolute numbers tell only part of the story. Probabilities of dying during the journey tell the rest. 
Figure 3.2. shows three peaks: (a) in 2007, linked to high mortality on the route to the Canary Islands; 
(b) in 2009, when the highest-ever probability of dying corresponds to a marked decrease in numbers 
of crossings combined with repeated wrecks on the Central Mediterranean route; and (c) in 2011, 
when the situation in Libya and Tunisia was the most chaotic. On the other side, it is in 2015 – the 
year of paroxysmal crisis in terms of crossings – that the lowest probability of dying could be recorded: 
“only” 3.7 per thousand compared with an average 15.4 during the whole period 2000–2017.28
Figure 3. Mortality at sea during the cross-Mediterranean journey to Europe (all routes combined), 
1 January 2000–31 July 2017
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27 T. Brian and F. Laczko (eds.), Fatal Journeys: Tracking Lives Lost during Migration (IOM, Geneva, 2014). Available from www.iom.int/files/
live/sites/iom/files/pbn/docs/Fatal-Journeys-Tracking-Lives-Lost-during-Migration-2014.pdf
28 Author’s calculation. See Table A.3. in the Appendix.
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Source:  Author’s calculations based on data retrieved from: (a) 2000–2015: Gabriele Del Grande’s blog, Fortress 
Europe (http://fortresseurope.blogspot.it/); and (b) 2016–2017 IOM, Missing Migrants Project (http://
missingmigrants.iom.int). For 2017, data refer only to the first two quarters. See Table A.3. in the Appendix.  
An apparent paradox is indeed the significant negative correlation (r = -0.44) found between the 
absolute number of migrants and the probability of dying: the larger the number of cross-Mediterranean 
migrants, the lowest their probability to drown or, put in other terms, the highest their probability to 
arrive safely at destination. A lesson must be drawn, that eradicating mortality at sea and stopping 
migration are distinct, and partly conflicting objectives. Of course, zero migration by sea would result 
in zero death at sea. But before that point can be reached (if it ever can), a reality must be taken into 
account: the shortest routes are at the same time the most travelled and the less deadly. Shutting 
them automatically translates into rising probability of dying. 
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5. Seeking protection or employment?
There is no doubt that any person making the decision to cross the Mediterranean at the risk of his 
or her life has imperative reasons to do so. Looking at the mix of despair and hope that motivates the 
move, the distinction between voluntary and forced migration – the first referring to economic causes 
and the second to political causes – is helpless.  However, once arrived in Europe and apprehended by 
the police, those who qualify for the status of refugee have a high probability to stay, but those who 
do not risk being returned. 
One notable feature of the crisis is that most migrants, including those fleeing conflict-torn countries, 
did not apply for asylum at arrival in Greece or Italy even though these are safe countries. They 
continued the journey through the administrative hurdles and physical barriers of the Balkans and 
Central Europe to reach Western or Northern Europe where they thought they would find a job. This 
fact could serve as an argument for allegations that these people were not seeking protection but 
employment, and therefore they were not refugees but economic migrants whom European States 
had no duty to welcome. A first question then is how migrants arrived by sea divide up between the 
two categories of refugees and economic migrants. A second question is whether this dichotomy is 
fully relevant in the particular circumstances of the crisis.
How many among migrants arrived by sea in Greece and Italy could qualify for the status of refugee? 
Data are lacking to answer this question. Indeed, registration of migrants at arrival on the one hand 
and refugee status determination on the other, are two distinct procedures carried out at different 
moments by different administrations (and often in different countries despite the obligation made 
by the Dublin Regulation29 to process asylum claims in the country by which claimants have entered 
Europe).  The only characteristic recorded by the Italian and Greek authorities at arrival that makes 
it possible to indirectly address this issue is the migrant’s nationality.30 Combining two independent 
series – the distribution of migrants by nationality provided by Greek and Italian police authorities 
(Table A.4.) and the rate of positive decisions on asylum claims lodged in the EU-2831 by nationality of 
the claimant provided by Eurostat (Table A.5.) – the proportion of refugees among people smuggled 
by sea to each of Greece and Italy can be roughly estimated (Table A.6.). 
Table 1 suggests that refugees have been a majority of migrants arrived by sea during the whole 
period 2009–2016 in Greece, but only in 2013 and 2014 in Italy. In both countries, their proportion has 
increased from 2011 to 2014, to reach a plateau in Greece and steadily decrease in Italy. Whether the 
real outcome of refugee-status determination will be different cannot be known, since public statistics 
on decisions on asylum do not make a distinction between the ways claimants have arrived.
Table 1. Estimated proportion of  refugees among migrants arrived by sea in Greece and Italy, 2009–2017
Country 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Greece 55.4% 55.7% 48.1% 59.6% 73.7% 76.7% 75.7% 72.0% 63.9%
Italy 36.8% 31.1% 21.7% 40.0% 62.2% 62.8% 49.5% 35.9% 31.6%
Source:  Arrivals, Greek and Italian police. Proportion of positive decisions on asylum, Eurostat. See Table A.6. in the Appendix.
29 See https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/examination-of-applicants_en 
30 The author could obtain annual data on arrivals by detailed country nationality for 1999–2017 in Italy but only for 2009–2016 in Greece.
31 Because most migrants arrived by sea in Greece and Italy actually lodged their asylum claims in countries other their country of arrival, 
the rate of positive decisions to be taken into account is at the European Union level. 
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Figure 4 provides a more nuanced picture. Migrants arrived by sea are distributed in three categories 
defined by the rate of positive decisions on asylum at European Union level by nationality of the 
claimant: (a) “likely refugees” (rate higher than 67%); (b) “undetermined status” (rate comprised 
between 33% and 66%); and (c) “likely economic migrants” (rate lower than 33%).  
Greece and Italy offer two contrasting pictures: the first as a passageway for mostly Syrian and other 
Middle Eastern asylum seekers, and the second as a hub for a large variety of mixed migration flows 
originating mainly in Africa. In Greece, likely refugees are at any point in time between 2009 and 201732 
the largest category, while likely economic migrants are in negligible numbers. As mentioned earlier 
(Figure 2), the vast majority of migrants arrived by sea in Greece belong to only three nationalities, 
which are among those with a high rate of positive decision on asylum in Europe: Syrians (95.5% 
positive decisions), Afghans (53.2%) and Iraqis (60.1%). Italy, by contrast, has received a wide spectrum 
of nationalities, with those corresponding to likely economic migrants being the largest group except 
in 2013 and 2014 (Figure 5). 
Figure 4. Arrivals by sea to Greece and Italy in 2009–2017, by likely status of  the migrants 
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Source:  Italian Ministry of the Interior, Greek Police and Eurostat. See Tables A.4. and A.5. in the 
Appendix.
32 The period 2009–2017 are the only years for which there is distribution of migrants arrived at sea by detailed country of nationality in 
both Greece and Italy.
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Figure 5. Top 10 origin of  migrants arriving in Greece and Italy by sea, 2009–2017 
(between brackets: positive decisions on asylum, %)
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At this point, it must be recalled that nationality does not prejudge the need for protection. Countries 
whose citizens’ asylum claims lodged in Europe have a high probability to be rejected may also 
produce genuine refugees. Table 2 shows the reasons for leaving their homeland provided by a sample 
of 1,031 migrants arrived by sea in Italy, interviewed in 2016 in several reception centres and informal 
settlements across the country.33 Eighty  per cent of the migrants were coming from sub-Saharan Africa. 
The top five countries of nationality were Nigeria (22.6%), Eritrea (10.6%), Ghana (9.4%), Sierra Leone 
(8.9%) and the Gambia (8.0%). Apart from Eritreans, nationals of all these countries have relatively low 
rates of positive decisions on asylum claims.  Nevertheless, most interviewed migrants motivated their 
departure from home by reasons that qualify for asylum or some form of temporary protection (such 
as insecurity, conflict and discrimination). Economic reasons were mentioned by less than a quarter 
of the migrants. Had friends or smugglers instructed interviewed migrants to systematically describe 
themselves as asylum seekers? The level of trust established during the interviews suggests instead 
that many were just telling the truth. 
33  Achilli et al., 2016.
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Table 2. Reasons for leaving the country of  origin provided by migrants arrived by sea in Italy, 2016
Reason* Frequency Percentage
Insecurity or conflict 609 59.07
Discrimination 441 42.77
Economic or work reasons 243 23.57
Family or friends 218 21.14
Respect for human rights in country of destination 42 4.07
Education reasons 31 3.01
Easy to get asylum in country of destination 19 1.84
No protection in the country of origin 8 0.78
Note: * Each migrant could give more than one reason. 
Source: Achilli et al., 2016.
Comparing the distribution by nationality of migrants entered by sea with no visa in Greece and Italy 
with that of migrants who were refused entry at the land and air external border of the European 
Union (Table 3) shows a marked bipolar distribution: nationalities that were most recorded at irregular 
entry by sea on one side, and nationalities that were most represented among people who were 
refused entry at the external border on the other side, are two separate groups. Put in other terms, 
most migrants smuggled by sea to Europe belong to nationalities that are not frequently refused entry 
at the external border, provided that they reach the border. The first group (10 or more arrivals by sea 
for 1 entry refused at the border) comprises nationals of countries such as the Syrian Arab Republic, 
Eritrea, Somalia, Afghanistan or Iraq, for whom obtaining a visa for a European State before departing 
from their country may simply be impossible, for example if no consulate is accessible. So how does 
the situation vary between countries from where migrants embark to Europe and with what impact 
on subsequent migration?
Table 3. Numbers of  migrants entered by sea with no visa compared with numbers of  migrants refused entry 
at the external border (land and air) by nationality, 2009–2016
Ratio 
arrivals by 
sea/refused 
entries
Consolidated numbers
Country/territory/regionArrivals by 
sea
Refused 
entries
10 or over 1,224,571 44,665 Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Eritrea, Gambia, Iraq, Somalia, Syrian 
Arab Republic, Palestinian Territories
1 to 10 379,422 112,245 Bangladesh, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Islamic Republic of Iran, Mali, Niger, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tunisia
0.1 to 1 19,212 105,455 Algeria, Benin, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Lebanon, 
Liberia, Libya, Mauritania, Myanmar, Nepal, Rwanda, Togo, Uganda, 
Yemen
Less than 0.1 20,517 2,892,835 Albania, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belize, Burundi, Cambodia, 
Canada, China, Taiwan Province of the People’s Republic of China, 
Colombia, Croatia, Cuba, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Gabon, 
Georgia, Haiti, India, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, 
Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Oman, 
Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, 
Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, United Republic of 
Tanzania, Thailand, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam, Western Balkan States, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe, Kosovo/UNSC 1244,
Source:  Italian Ministry of the Interior and Greek Police for arrivals by sea (Table A.4. in the Appendix); Eurostat for entries refused at the 
external border.
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6. Turkey and Libya are not the same 
The Eastern Mediterranean route – now almost entirely closed or at least on hold – has mostly been 
travelled by asylum seekers, a fact that invites to reflect on irregular migration for the purpose of 
protection-seeking. 
Almost all migrants arrived by sea in Greece had departed from Turkey. They had left behind war-torn 
countries (Syrian Arab Republic, Afghanistan, Iraq and a few others) from where they had reached 
Turkey, either directly or after a stay in another country, such as Lebanon, Jordan or Iraq. Growing 
numbers starting from 2013 coincided with two major developments: (a) rise of the so-called Islamic 
State, triggering new exoduses from Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic; and (b) deterioration of the 
refugee situation in countries where they had first found shelter, particularly Jordan and Lebanon, as 
well as Turkey. 
These three countries have among the world’s largest refugee populations, but they are not parties 
to the 1951 Refugee Convention or party, in the case of Turkey, but with a geographic limitation to 
Europe excluding the refugees from non-European countries. It must be noted, however, that a Turkish 
law of 2014 established a status of “conditional refugee” applicable to non-Europeans and providing 
them with a number of Convention-like guarantees.34 These three countries have a charity-based, as 
opposed to a rights-based, approach to refugees, who are admitted as “guests”: they enter legally, but 
for a limited period of time during which they have little social and economic rights. Access to income-
generating activities is restricted and mostly informal. Once their entry visa expires, they lose the right 
to stay, and they must choose between falling into limbo and trying to leave. Moreover, once their 
savings dry up, they have no choice but to leave.  
The situation in host countries started to deteriorate when refugee flows gained enormous momentum 
in 2014. Rising pressure on health and education services, as well as on local labour markets, and also 
potentially destabilizing consequences of refugee flows on the political stability of host States, gradually 
created an untenable situation in countries of first asylum. Seeking asylum further away, in Europe, 
became the only way out for many refugees. But Europe offers almost no resettlement opportunities, 
by which the status of refugee is recognized before the person can safely travel to Europe. In the same 
vein, humanitarian visas allowing people to travel legally to a European Union State in order to lodge 
an asylum claim at arrival are never delivered by European embassies, though they exist in European 
law. In order to reach the territory of Europe and lodge an asylum claim, refugees have no choice but 
to do what migrants do: either obtain a visa for any other purpose (work, study, family reunion or 
tourism) or travel with no visa and resort to the services of a migrant smuggler. 
Table 4 shows that the second option was the only one left to 77.5 per cent of the 830,000 Syrian 
refugees who were able to enter the European Union between the beginning of the conflict in the Syrian 
Arab Republic and the enforcement of the European Union–Turkey agreement. But once in Europe, 
96.6 per cent of them were granted refugee status or temporary protection. So, was it necessary to 
put so many hurdles on their way? The only reason one can see is the anti-migration sentiment that 
grows in most of the developed world, including Europe, in parallel with flourishing populism and neo-
nationalism. Should have resettlement and humanitarian visas been used, refugee movements to the 
European Union would have taken place in a legal, orderly manner, at lower costs but not necessarily 
larger scale, and Europe would have respected its founding principles of human rights and protection. 
34 Turkey (Republic of), Ministry of Interior, Directorate General of Migration Management, Law on Foreigners and International Protection 
(Ankara, 2014). The conditional refugees shall be allowed to reside in Turkey temporarily until they are resettled to a third country.
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Table 4. Syrian nationals smuggled by sea and granted asylum once in Europe between 
April 2011 and the European Union–Turkey statement of  March 2016
(1) Syrians smuggled by sea to Greece and Italy 641,502
(2) First-time asylum applicants from the Syrian Arab Republic in 
the EU-28
827,500
(3)=(2)/(1) Proportion of Syrian asylum seekers entered in Europe 
through Greece and Italy
77.5%
(4) Decisions on asylum 
applications lodged by Syrians
All decisions 564,875
Positive decisions 545,470
% Positive 96.6%
(5)=(1)×(4, % positive) Expected number of Syrians smuggled by 
sea who would have obtained a humanitarian visa before travelling 
to the European Union
619,465
Source:  Author’s calculation on the basis of Greece and Italian Police data on persons smuggled by sea and 
Eurostat data on asylum claims and decisions.
The situation in the Central Mediterranean route differs in many regards. Since the closure of the 
eastern route, the central route has become the relatively most travelled. What worked for the eastern 
route ‒  i.e. subcontracting the closure with Turkey, a strong State capable of efficiently controlling its 
shore ‒ cannot work the same way for the central route. Most migrants arriving by sea in Italy are now 
departing from Libya, and exceptionally Egypt and Tunisia. By contrast with Turkey, in Libya, the State 
failure and proliferation of militias give the smuggling business free rein to operate. Making a deal 
with factions ruling over part of Libya’s territory, or with militias, or directly with the smugglers, would 
not only bring disgrace to European States abdicating their founding principles and closing their eyes 
on people knocking at their door from one of the most dangerous places on Earth, but also bring no 
guarantee that boats will not continue to depart from just a few kilometres away. 
There were very few Libyan nationals among migrants who departed from the Libyan shore in 2016 
and 2017. All were already international migrants in the country. While Libya is no longer the major 
destination for migrant workers it was before its dictator was removed in 2011, the job opportunities it 
still offers continue to attract migrants from neighbouring countries and further away in Africa, despite 
the high level of insecurity in the country. They are all migrant workers, but in addition, some of them 
are at the same time asylum seekers and migrants in vulnerable situations, such as victims of human 
trafficking. Indeed, Libya is not party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, and it does not recognize 
the status of refugee. Colonel Gadhafi used to claim his country had not a single refugee. In reality, 
however, not providing refugees with a status does not mean that there are no people among migrants 
in Libya who would qualify for this status should it be available to them. Migrants originating from the 
Horn of Africa and Sudan may well be de facto refugees in Libya. 
Other foreign nationals may have entered Libya with the aim of reaching Europe but found themselves 
stuck in the country. Some are kept in detention centres where they are exposed to all sorts of abuse, 
from sexual slavery to assassination, and others are informally employed waiting for a passage to 
Europe. 
Would the two above-mentioned groups of migrants, those attracted by the Libyan labour market and 
those in transit for Europe, be one single population of candidates to the perilous cross-Mediterranean 
journey to Europe? Data available, whatever scanty they are, seem to indicate that they do not 
overlap much. Table 5 shows that the top five foreign nationalities among migrants estimated to be 
presently in Libya (representing 61.8% of all nationalities in Libya according to IOM estimates35) are 
35 IOM, Displacement tracking matrix (DTM): Libya’s migrant report, Round 11, June–July 2017, available from https://drive.google.com/
file/d/0B-qpxdnv9nlWOE5wU3VQOVlqQWM/view. DTM reports provide the only information one can find in the absence of any 
administrative records, census or population survey in Libya today. 
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only 10.1 per cent of the nationalities recorded at arrivals in Italy. The majority of migrants estimated 
to be present in Libya come from four neighbouring countries (Egypt, the Niger, Chad and Sudan), but 
these countries represent only 7 per cent of nationalities recorded among migrants smuggled by sea 
to Italy. The idea that migration should be monitored (and stopped?) before it reaches Libya if Europe 
wants to shut the central Mediterranean route seems simplistic and wrong. 
Table 5. Distribution by nationality of  foreign population in Libya and migrants smuggled by sea from Libya to Italy
Country of 
nationality
Egypt Niger Chad Sudan Ghana Others
Total
% N
1.  Foreign 
population 
present in 
Libya (2017)
17.9% 16.4% 12.9% 8.8% 5.8% 38.2% 100.0% 393,652
2.  Migrants 
smuggled 
by sea from 
Libya to Italy 
(2015–2017)
1.7% 0.0% 0.0% 5.2% 3.1% 89.9% 100.0% 435,022
Sources:  1 – IOM; 2 – Italian Police. See Table A.4. in the Appendix, 2017.
Finally, now that the main route for refugees has been barred and Europe is left with dealing with flows 
arriving mostly from the Libyan shore, a nagging question must be addressed: Are recent flows in the 
Channel of Sicily an early warning  of the long-announced mass migration from sub-Saharan Africa to 
Europe? This paper is not the right place to discuss the scenario according to which the demography 
of sub-Saharan Africa (characterized by rapid population growth and rising proportion of young adults 
soon leading to a peak, “the youth bulge”), combined with the closure of African nations to further 
flows of immigration, will radically overhaul the map of global migration.  
Figure 6 representing migrants arrived by sea to each of Greece and Italy by region of nationality 
highlights the contrast between the two routes: (a) eastern route with migrants arrived from Asia 
and the Middle East; and (b) central route characterized by the momentum gained by migration from 
sub-Saharan Africa. During the years 2009–2017, the Italian police counted 507,240 arrivals from sub-
Saharan Africa representing 68.7 per cent of all arrivals by sea to Europe. From 1 January 2015 to 
30 June 2017 alone, arrivals from sub-Saharan Africa were 343,380, representing 79 per cent of the 
total. The trend is undoubtedly rising. 
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Figure 6. Arrivals by sea to Greece and Italy by region of  origin, 2009–2017
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     Source:   Italian Ministry of the Interior and Greek Police, 2017.
How numbers of irregular entries by sea compare with regular entries from sub-Saharan African 
countries becomes then a question. Table 6 comparing sea entries with first permits of residence 
issued in the EU-2836 shows two groups of countries. The first group, in which nationals in Europe have 
mostly entered irregularly by sea, comprises only four countries that are all major sources of refugee 
movements.  All other countries belong to the second group in which first permits outnumber irregular 
entries by sea. All African countries but one (Eritrea) belong to that group. Africa’s largest nationalities 
represented in Europe are not those recorded at irregular arrival by sea. On the contrary, the bulk of 
Africa’s migration to Europe mostly corresponds to legal admission procedures.
 
36 First permits of residence are used as a proxy for regular entries of migrants. Such statistics are systematically provided by Eurostat.
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Table 6. Distribution by nationality of  migrants arrived by sea in Greece and Italy and first permits 
issued in the European Union, 2009–2016
Origin of nationality  Arrivals by sea  
 First permits of 
residence 
 Ratio arrivals/
Permits 
 I – Irregular entries by sea outnumber first permits
Afghanistan 265,782 161,336 1.65
Palestinian Territories 20,668 13,645 1.51
Eritrea 106,294 105,071 1.01
Syrian Arab Republic 640,327 637,244 1.00
 II – First permits outnumber irregular entries by sea 
Gambia 31,939 35,883 0.89
Sudan 22,472 31,016 0.72
Iraq 115,346 188,643 0.61
Mali 29,894 62,196 0.48
Guinea 18,172 49,897 0.36
Somalia 42,831 122,294 0.35
Côte d’Ivoire 19,275 67,312 0.29
Nigeria 78,354 279,987 0.28
Ethiopia 7,255 37,211 0.19
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 28,744 157,365 0.18
Tunisia 37,160 213,513 0.17
Senegal 22,652 151,386 0.15
Ghana 15,448 108,196 0.14
Bangladesh 23,488 223,380 0.11
Egypt 18,975 185,536 0.10
Pakistan 44,564 462,900 0.10
Cameroon 5,821 89,204 0.07
Algeria 6,415 280,052 0.02
Morocco 20,107 934,730 0.02
Note: * Arrivals recorded in Greece and Italy.
Source:  Italian Ministry of the Interior and Greek Police for arrivals by sea to Italy and Greece, respectively; 
Eurostat for first permits of residence issued.
Four Decades of Cross-Mediterranean Undocumented Migration to Europe | A Review of the Evidence 24
7. By way of conclusion: For a data 
collection and research agenda
A number of questions remain unanswered for lack of reliable data, accurate knowledge on what 
happened, why, how and with what consequences.  Deficits of knowledge are detrimental to all the 
involved parties, in the first place the migrants themselves, as well as their hosts and all those who 
strive for finding solutions, from civil society actors to governments, not forgetting the media who 
convey messages that have proved to foster all possible sentiments, from compassion to rejection and 
intolerance. Not only more data must be collected and better organized and disseminated, but also 
creative conceptual frameworks must be developed since numbers hardly speak by themselves.
7.1.  Collecting the experience of migrants 
Understanding the circumstances in which migrants decided to do the journey in relation to their 
individual situation and their broader environment, then capturing the problems they faced and the 
responses they brought throughout the journey from the homeland to Europe, and eventually figuring 
out their future plans, are keys for taking informed action. Questions such as the following must be 
answered: 
• Why did migrants resort to smugglers and embark for the most costly and dangerous journey, 
risking death at sea or forced return at arrival?  Had they tried to obtain and been refused a 
visa? Were they properly informed about the risks? Had they no other choice?37 
• Who are they in terms of demographic, family, economic and educational profiles? 
• How long was their journey and what were the hurdles and solutions, in particular in the last 
leg of the journey before they embarked for Europe? 
• What was their situation in their home country? And in the country from where they departed 
for Europe?
• What is their situation at destination?
• What future do they see for themselves?
These or similar questions are routinely asked by administrations in charge of instructing asylum 
claims. But information collected in this framework is never systematically organized and made public. 
If the objective is to go beyond anecdotal information offered by media stories and build systematic 
knowledge, ad hoc surveys should be conducted, although interviews are difficult to conduct in this 
particular context. Moreover, surveys should cover migrants in various situations, from persons 
detained and to be returned, to persons successfully settled at destination through asylum or other 
channels.
37 Two recent reports from IOM Global Migration Data Analysis Centre attempted to answer some of these questions; see http://gmdac.
iom.int/iom-niger-2016-migrant-profiling-report and http://gmdac.iom.int/risks-migration-nigeria-iraq
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7.2. Measuring the impact of measures taken by governments and 
non-governmental actors
Monitoring immediate action (e.g. and rescue at high sea, border control, “hotspots”, detention) and 
broader policies (e.g. bilateral agreements, regulations on asylum, aid to development, “hotspots”) 
requires detailed statistics on the targeted phenomenon (e.g. monthly interceptions at high sea and 
arrivals by sea by country of nationality, country of departure and country of destination), as well as 
on related phenomena (e.g. origin and destination matrices of regular migration, interceptions and 
returns, distribution of population by nationality in countries of departure). Data collection is already 
made by different administrations in different countries (origin and destination countries), but what is 
missing is a framework for processing and harmonizing the data.
Assessing longer-term action ‒ for example measures regarding migrants’ integration and their 
particular impact on those arrived by sea ‒ requires data routinely collected by administrations 
to be specifically requested and processed. For example, monitoring health and access to health 
among Syrian or other refugees arrived by sea can be made using data routinely collected by health 
facilities, provided that these are specifically requested to produce statistics by nationality (a variable 
systematically recorded). A list of the most pressing topics and the corresponding requests to relevant 
administrations and organizations should be established.
7.3. Assessing the situation of migrants stranded in Turkey and Libya
Has the European Union–Turkey statement affected the situation of migrants who were waiting for a 
passage to Europe and in what manner, and the situation of their Turkish hosts? 
Similar questions must be asked about Libya in order to anticipate what consequences an effective 
closure of the sea border resulting in migrants stranded in the country could produce.
In both cases, fieldwork has to be conducted. Given the difficulties interviewers may face in conducting 
face-to-face surveys among migrants in Turkey and particularly in Libya, alternative methodologies 
such as focus group discussions carried out in places where migrants gather must be considered. 
The important point is collecting evidence about the risks migrants are exposed to as a result of 
governmental deals between Europe and the countries where they are stranded.
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Appendices
Table A.1. Unauthorized entries by sea into Europe as recorded by police authorities, 1998–2017
Year Italy Greece Spain Malta All sea routes
1998 38,142    38,142
1999 48,161  4,859  53,020
2000 26,817  15,025  41,842
2001 20,143  18,517  38,660
2002 23,719  16,670  40,389
2003 14,170  19,176 520 33,866
2004 13,635  15,675 1,388 30,698
2005 22,939  11,781 1,822 36,542
2006 22,016  39,180 1,720 62,916
2007 20,455  18,057 1,702 40,214
2008 36,951  13,424 2,775 53,150
2009 9,573 10,165 7,285 1,475 28,498
2010 4,406 1,766 3,632 47 9,851
2011 62,692 757 5,443 1,579 70,471
2012 13,267 1,627 3,804 1,890 20,588
2013 42,925 9,357 3,237 2,008 57,527
2014 170,099 34,441 4,552 568 209,660
2015 153,844 847,924 15,422*** 104 1,017,294
2016 181,436 165,574 9,467 25 356,502
2017* 100,325 17,304 10,362  127,991
Total** 1,025,715 1,088,915 235,568 17,623 2,367,821
Notes: *  1 January–12 September 
 **  Sum of available data. Total number would also include missing data.
***  In 2015, arrivals to Spain include sea as well as land arrivals to the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. This may also be the case of 
some of the previous years if separate data for sea arrivals are not provided.
Sources: Italy:  Italian Ministry of Interior  (Internal request at unimonitoraggioimmigrazione@interno.it);  Greece: Hellenic Police,  Ministry 
of Public Order and Citizen Protection (www.astynomia.gr/index.php?option=ozo_content&perform=view&id=24727&Item 
id=73&lang=EN); Spain: Ministry of Interior; Malta: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (www.unhcr.org.
mt/charts/, retrieved on September 2017).   
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Table A.2. Monthly arrivals by sea in Greece from 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2015 – Top five nationalities
Date/Nationality
Syrian Arab 
Republic
Afghanistan Iraq Pakistan
Islamic 
Republic of 
Iran
All 
nationalities
January 2014 355 213 2 0 1 3,031
February 2014 496 212 2 0 2 2,977
March 2014 824 199 1 0 1 3,533
April 2014 877 298 0 0 0 3,812
May 2014 920 391 3 1 7 4,904
June 2014 1,602 788 2 8 10 6,214
July 2014 1,763 1,306 12 1 11 7,599
August 2014 3,073 1,634 21 14 11 9,865
September 2014 3,822 1,741 17 0 5 11,575
October 2014 3,157 2,171 15 0 4 11,628
November 2014 1,435 1,195 185 1 33 7,494
December 2014 658 532 16 4 2 4,531
January 2015 657 429 24 9 6 4,001
February 2015 1,387 525 55 19 9 4,920
March 2015 4,051 1,327 193 153 23 10,567
April 2015 6,571 3,010 393 658 32 16,684
May 2015 9,915 4,762 663 1,415 51 23,497
June 2015 17,838 8,289 1,374 2,148 145 36,881
July 2015 36,075 12,524 1,855 2,545 280 60,176
August 2015 83,173 17,607 3,216 1,578 435 114,430
September 2015 100,243 23,305 11,550 2,634 1,598 150,957
October 2015 108,219 63,990 22,238 3,218 7,079 217,936
November 2015 65,733 43,518 18,402 5,150 9,165 157,321
December 2015 42,038 26,572 27,020 3,733 3,453 114,101
Source:  Greek Police.
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Table A.3. Mortality at sea during the cross-Mediterranean journey to Europe (all routes combined), 2000–2017
Year Arrivals Dead and missing
Probability of dying 
(deaths per 1,000 
crossings)
2000 41,842 636 15.0
2001 38,660 426 10.9
2002 40,389 809 19.6
2003 33,346 1,375 39.6
2004 29,310 1,178 38.6
2005 34,720 1,203 33.5
2006 61,196 2,165 34.2
2007 38,512 2,502 61.0
2008 53,079 1,664 30.4
2009 18,217 1,658 83.4
2010 9,717 254 25.5
2011 70,295 4,073 54.8
2012 20,721 683 31.9
2013 55,986 756 13.3
2014 209,663 3,317 15.6
2015 908,558 3,416 3.7
2016 368,980 5,096 13.6
2017 105,808 2,253 20.8
2000–2017 2,138,999 33,464 15.4
Source:  Author’s calculation based on data retrieved from: (a) 2000–2015: Gabriele Del Grande’s blog, Fortress 
Europe (http://fortresseurope.blogspot.it/); and (b) 2016–2017 IOM, Missing Migrants Project (https://
missingmigrants.iom.int). For 2017, data refer only to the first two quarters.
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Table A.4. Arrivals at sea by country or territory of  origin, 1 January 2009–30 June 2017
       4.1. Greece
Country/territory/region of origin 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total
Afghanistan 4,048 593 259 582 3,490 10,680 205,858 40,272 538 266,320
Albania 0 15 2 3 10 5 1   36
Algeria 19 9 0 158 82 12 1,353 1,678 507 3,818
Angola 0 0 0 0 0 0 6   6
Armenia 1 0 0 0 0 0 9   10
Azerbaijan          0
Bangladesh 40 8 0 3 4 0 3,598   3,653
Belize          0
Benin 0 0 0 0 0 4 5   9
Bulgaria          0
Burkina Faso 0 0 0 1 0 2 32   35
Burundi 0 1 0 0 0 0 12   13
Cambodia          0
Cameroon 2 0 0 0 13 285 861 650 219 2,030
Canada          0
Central African Republic 0 0 0 0 1 51 31   83
Chad          0
China 0 0 0 0 0 0 52   52
Taiwan Province of the People’s 
Republic of China
         0
Colombia 0 0 0 0 0 0 2   2
Comoros 0 0 0 0 0 117 53   170
Democratic Republic of the Congo 5 0 0 0 2 116 1,217 362 631 2,333
Côte d’Ivoire 0 0 0 0 1 47 231   279
Croatia 0 0 0 0 1 0 0   1
Cuba 0 0 0 0 0 2 2   4
Djibouti          0
Dominican Republic 0 0 0 0 3 0 0   3
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Country/territory/region of origin 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total
Egypt 56 4 238 1 9 307 541   1,156
Eritrea 422 76 5 11 484 735 895   2,628
Ethiopia 0 1 1 5 3 22 71   103
Western Balkan States          0
France          0
Gabon 0 0 0 0 0 8 5   13
Gambia 0 0 1 0 2 17 185   205
Georgia 8 0 0 11 18 0 3   40
Ghana 0 0 0 1 4 41 281   327
Greece          0
Guinea 1 0 0 0 0 3 36   40
Guinea-Bissau 0 0 0 0 0 0 28   28
Haiti          0
Hungary          0
India 6 11 0 3 3 0 177   200
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 75 66 18 33 92 87 22,276 5,306 226 28,179
Iraq 216 71 25 20 32 276 86,983 23,823 1,248 112,694
Israel          0
Jamaica 0 0 0 0 0 0 5   5
Jordan 0 0 0 0 0 0 48   48
Kazakhstan 0 0 0 0 0 0 3   3
Kenya 0 0 0 0 0 0 4   4
Kuwait 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 21 208 279
Kyrgyzstan          0
Latvia          0
Lebanon 341 5 0 2 2 7 1,974   2,331
Lesotho          0
Liberia 0 0 0 0 0 4 12   16
Libya 16 0 0 1 1 0 405   423
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Country/territory/region of origin 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total
Lithuania          0
Madagascar          0
Malawi          0
Malaysia          0
Maldives          0
Mali 0 0 0 0 28 163 357   548
Malta          0
Mauritania 3 0 0 0 0 1 38   42
Mauritius          0
Morocco 4 4 1 33 48 18 7,368 0 0 7,476
Mozambique          0
Myanmar 6 0 0 3 9 4 174 0 0 196
Nepal 1 0 0 0 0 0 252   253
Niger 0 0 0 0 1 0 9   10
Nigeria 5 0 0 0 0 99 686   790
Oman          0
Pakistan 120 6 0 20 25 29 23,260 8,457 427 32,344
Peru          0
Philippines 4 0 0 0 0 0 4   8
Poland          0
Qatar          0
Republic of Korea 0
Republic of Moldova 4 0 0 3 0 0 2   9
Romania          0
Russian Federation 0 0 0 0 0 14 2   16
Rwanda 41 0 0 0 2 5 16   64
Saudi Arabia 0 0 0 0 0 1 20   21
Senegal 3 0 0 0 0 1 143   147
Sierra Leone 2 0 0 1 0 49 64   116
Slovenia          0
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Somalia 2,316 178 4 4 406 1,500 4,418   8,826
South Africa 0 0 0 0 0 12 15   27
Sri Lanka 55 1 0 0 1 4 195   256
Sudan 37 0 0 0 39 145 376 0 0 597
Syrian Arab Republic 29 22 83 513 4,313 18,982 475,900 77,572 3,388 580,802
Tajikistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 7   7
United Republic of Tanzania          0
Thailand          0
Togo 0 0 0 0 0 12 53   65
Tunisia 2 1 0 5 14 1 129   152
Turkey 102 32 35 27 2 17 46 0 0 261
Turkmenistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 3   3
United Arab Emirates          0
Uganda 0 0 0 0 0 15 185   200
Ukraine 0 0 0 0 0 1 3   4
United Kingdom          0
Uzbekistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 15   15
Viet Nam 2 0 0 0 0 0 0   2
Yemen 0 0 0 0 7 19 341   367
Zambia 0 0 0 0 0 1 6   7
Zimbabwe          0
Kosovo/UNSC 1244          0
Palestinian Territories 2,172 662 85 182 205 469 6,115 1,714 383 11,987
Horn of Africa (not specified) 0
Sub-Sahara (not specified)          0
Unspecified/Others 1 0 0 1 0 51 417 5,720 1,116 7,306
Total 10,165 1,766 757 1,627 9,357 34,441 847,924 165,574 8,891 1,080,502
            Source:  Greek Police, 2017.
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       4.2. Italy
Country/territory of origin 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total
Afghanistan          0
Albania 0 5 3 2 2 0 9   21
Algeria 521 297 328 42 160 188 343 1,225 828 3,932
Angola 0 0 3 0 1 0 2   6
Armenia          0
Azerbaijan 0 0 0 2 0 0 0   2
Bangladesh 157 12 1,279 622 323 4,358 4,953 8,131 8,687 28,522
Belize 0 0 0 0 0 1 0   1
Benin 1 0 63 1 14 106 383   568
Bulgaria 0 0 1 0 0 2 0   3
Burkina Faso 43 0 589 4 20 233 460   1,349
Burundi 0 0 0 0 0 1 1   2
Cambodia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   0
Cameroon 7 0 121 1 19 115 648 3,099 1,991 6,001
Canada 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   0
Central African Republic 0 0 3,987 27 2 29 31   4,076
Chad 0 0 678 1 14 87 166   946
China 2 0 0 0 0 0 0   2
Taiwan Province of the People’s 
Republic of China
0 0 0 0 0 0 0   0
Colombia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   0
Comoros 0 0 0 0 0 6 192   198
Democratic Republic of the Congo 3 0 106 0 4 142 149 0 0 404
Côte d’Ivoire 126 16 1,232 8 93 1,484 3,641 12,396 7,905 26,901
Croatia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   0
Cuba          0
Djibouti 0 0 0 0 0 1 2   3
Four D
ecades of C
ross-M
editerranean U
ndocum
ented M
igration to Europe | A
 Review
 of the Evidence 
34
Country/territory of origin 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total
Dominican Republic          0
Egypt 424 551 1,989 1,221 2,728 4,091 2,585 4,230 524 18,343
Eritrea 925 55 386 1,428 9,834 33,451 36,869 20,718 5,325 108,991
Ethiopia 22 2 42 115 547 553 2,424 3,447 640 7,792
Western Balkan States 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   0
France 0 0 1 0 0 0 0   1
Gabon 0 0 7 0 2 2 3   14
Gambia 94 1 315 348 2,619 8,159 8,269 11,929 5,465 37,199
Georgia 0 3 2 0 0 1 1   7
Ghana 210 0 2,655 22 375 2,027 4,196 5,636 3,520 18,641
Greece 0 4 7 0 1 2 2   16
Guinea 42 4 526 28 326 1,197 2,664 13,345 8,631 26,763
Guinea-Bissau 3 0 30 5 59 203 412   712
Haiti 0 0 1 0 0 0 0   1
Hungary 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   0
India 25 0 16 74 43 34 20   212
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 57 206 153 111 80 65 119 0 0 791
Iraq 171 207 183 143 67 678 996 1,455 1,156 5,056
Israel 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   0
Jamaica 0 0 0 1 0 0 0   1
Jordan 0 0 0 0 0 12 10   22
Kazakhstan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   0
Kenya 1 0 1 0 0 4 13   19
Kuwait 0 0 0 0 0 0 1   1
Kyrgyzstan 0 0 0 0 0 4 0   4
Latvia 0 0 0 1 0 0 0   1
Lebanon 2 1 1 0 3 19 11   37
Lesotho 0 0 1 0 0 0 0   1
Liberia 8 0 49 2 25 28 129   241
Libya 9 14 228 22 6 205 511   995
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Country/territory of origin 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 0 1 0   1
Madagascar 0 0 0 0 0 0 25   25
Malawi 0 0 0 0 3 0 0   3
Malaysia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   0
Maldives 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   0
Mali 125 1 2,393 218 1,675 9,314 5,610 10,010 5,526 34,872
Malta 3 0 0 0 0 0 0   3
Mauritania 2 0 52 0 5 37 84   180
Mauritius 0 0 0 0 0 0 1   1
Morocco 456 54 299 87 225 2,451 4,505 4,554 4,632 17,263
Mozambique 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   0
Myanmar 0 6 3 0 3 2 1 0 0 15
Nepal 1 2 0 1 7 50 47   108
Niger 21 1 603 3 26 94 135   883
Nigeria 1,663 0 5,480 358 2,680 8,570 21,262 37,551 16,317 93,881
Oman 0 0 0 0 0 2 0   2
Pakistan 1 55 1,423 1,238 1,753 3,678 1,726 2,773 2,390 15,037
Peru 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   0
Philippines 0 0 2 0 0 3 6   11
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   0
Qatar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   0
Republic of Korea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Republic of Moldova 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   0
Romania 0 0 0 1 0 0 0   1
Russian Federation 0 1 2 1 1 3 0   8
Rwanda 0 0 2 0 0 0 1   3
Saudi Arabia 0 0 0 0 0 2 0   2
Senegal 11 0 448 48 1,314 4,652 5,705 10,327 5,366 27,871
Sierra Leone 9 0 70 5 51 160 217 1,468 1,030 3,010
Four D
ecades of C
ross-M
editerranean U
ndocum
ented M
igration to Europe | A
 Review
 of the Evidence 
36
Country/territory of origin 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   0
Somalia 2,245 61 1,092 2,179 3,263 5,644 12,240 7,281 2,327 36,332
South Africa 0 0 2 0 0 1 1   4
Sri Lanka 6 3 22 0 4 6 0   41
Sudan 19 4 683 15 217 3,101 8,509 9,327 4,991 26,866
Syrian Arab Republic 40 191 328 580 11,307 41,941 7,326 1,200 1,939 64,852
Tajikistan          0
United Republic of Tanzania 0 0 2 9 0 0 1   12
Thailand 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   0
Togo 11 0 178 6 45 119 334   693
Tunisia 1,522 650 28,047 2,259 833 1,621 869 1,207 846 37,854
Turkey 172 160 87 55 9 9 3 0 0 495
Turkmenistan          0
United Arab Emirates 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   0
Uganda 0 0 3 0 2 1 2   8
Ukraine 0 11 17 7 4 8 22   69
United Kingdom 0 1 0 0 0 0 0   1
Uzbekistan 0 0 0 0 0 1 0   1
Viet Nam 0 0 0 0 0 0 1   1
Yemen 0 0 0 0 3 29 46   78
Zambia 0 0 0 0 0 5 1   6
Zimbabwe 0 0 2 1 2 1 1   7
Kosovo/UNSC 1244 0 0 0 0 7 0 0   7
Palestinian Territories 46 128 137 37 1,075 6,024 1,617   9,064
Horn of Africa (not specified) 0 0 4,157 189 0 0 0   4,346
Sub-Sahara (not specified) 0 0 0 0 80 24,297 13,213   37,590
Unspecified/Others 367 1,699 2,175 1,739 964 784 118 10,127 9,706 27,679
Total 9,573 4,406 62,692 13,267 42,925 170,099 153,844 181,436 99,742 737,984
             Source:    Italian Ministry of the Interior, 2017.
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Afghanistan 53.2%
Albania 4.6%
Algeria 4.5%
Angola 18.5%
Armenia 8.5%
Azerbaijan 19.1%
Bangladesh 10.5%
Belize 0.0%
Benin 15.4%
Burkina Faso 28.4%
Burundi 41.8%
Cambodia 25.0%
Cameroon 23.2%
Canada 14.8%
Central African 
Republic
65.3%
Chad 31.0%
China 20.9%
Taiwan Province 
of the People’s 
Republic of 
China
9.1%
Colombia 14.0%
Comoros 12.1%
Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo 
20.6%
Côte d’Ivoire 30.2%
Cuba 46.3%
Djibouti 43.3%
Dominican Republic 2.0%
Egypt 25.7%
Eritrea 84.6%
Ethiopia 39.7%
Gabon 24.4%
Gambia 30.8%
Georgia 4.2%
Ghana 28.1%
Guinea 29.8%
Guinea-Bissau 23.0%
Haiti 6.8%
India 2.4%
Iran (Islamic 
Republic of)
48.9%
Iraq 60.1%
Israel 11.5%
Jamaica 21.8%
Jordan 22.6%
Kazakhstan 14.4%
Kenya 14.7%
Kuwait 45.8%
Kyrgyzstan 14.8%
Lebanon 12.4%
Lesotho 0.0%
Liberia 26.4%
Libya 39.4%
Madagascar 10.9%
Malawi 15.2%
Malaysia 22.1%
Maldives 100.0%
Mali 38.3%
Mauritania 14.9%
Mauritius 8.6%
Morocco 8.6%
Mozambique 14.3%
Myanmar 48.3%
Nepal 11.4%
Niger 30.9%
Nigeria 20.9%
Oman 12.5%
Pakistan 16.7%
Peru 14.2%
Philippines 5.6%
Qatar 16.7%
Republic of 
Moldova
4.2%
Russian Federation 23.0%
Rwanda 38.2%
Saudi Arabia 51.2%
Senegal 25.8%
Sierra Leone 27.4%
Somalia 65.7%
South Africa 10.0%
Sri Lanka 24.6%
Sudan 47.5%
Syrian Arab 
Republic
95.5%
Tajikistan 23.6%
United Republic of 
Tanzania
14.5%
Thailand 11.8%
Togo 25.9%
Tunisia 8.3%
Turkey 16.8%
Turkmenistan 24.8%
United Arab 
Emirates
30.0%
Uganda 41.4%
Ukraine 23.4%
Uzbekistan 19.4%
Viet Nam 7.0%
Western Balkan 
States
0.9%
Yemen 57.8%
Zambia 20.0%
Zimbabwe 30.1%
Kosovo/UNSC 1244 4.6%
Palestinian 
Territories
57.3%
Source:  Eurostat, 2017.
Table A.5. Percentage of  positive decision on asylum claims by country or territory of  origin, 2008–2016
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Table A.6. Top ten places of  origin of  migrants arrived by sea in Greece and Italy and estimated proportion of  refugees 2009–2017
       6.1. Greece
Country/territory 
of origin
Arrivals by sea by nationality and year Positive 
decisions2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total
Syrian Arab Republic 29 22 83 513 4,313 18,982 475,900 77,572 3,388 580,802 95.5%
Afghanistan 4,048 593 259 582 3,490 10,680 205,858 40,272 538 266,320 53.2%
Iraq 216 71 25 20 32 276 86,983 23,823 1,248 112,694 60.1%
Pakistan 120 6 0 20 25 29 23,260 8,457 427 32,344 16.7%
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 75 66 18 33 92 87 22,276 5,306 226 28,179 48.9%
Somalia 2,316 178 4 4 406 1,500 4,418   8,826 65.7%
Morocco 4 4 1 33 48 18 7,368 0 0 7,476 8.6%
Algeria 19 9 0 158 82 12 1,353 1,678 507 3,818 4.5%
Bangladesh 40 8 0 3 4 0 3,598   3,653 10.5%
Palestinian Territories 2,172 662 85 182 205 469 6,115 1,714 383 11,987 57.3%
Others  1,126 147 282 79 660 2,388 10,795 6,752 2,174 24,403 34.1%
Total 10,165 1,766 757 1,627 9,357 34,441 847,924 165,574 8,891 1,080,502
Estimated % refugees* 55.4% 55.7% 48.1% 59.6% 73.7% 76.7% 75.7% 72.0% 63.9% 74.8%
           Source:    Arrivals: Greek Police, 2017; Proportion of positive decisions on asylum: Eurostat, 2017.
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      6.2. Italy
Country/territory of 
nationality
Arrivals by sea by nationality and year Positive 
decisions2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total
Eritrea 925 55 386 1,428 9,834 33,451 36,869 20,718 5,325 108,991 84.6%
Nigeria 1,663    0 5,480 358 2,680 8,570 21,262 37,551 16,317 93,881 20.9%
Syrian Arab Republic 40 191 328 580 11,307 41,941 7,326 1,200 1,939 64,852 95.5%
Tunisia 1,522 650 28,047 2,259 833 1,621 869 1,207 846 37,854 8.3%
Gambia 94 1 315 348 2,619 8,159 8,269 11,929 5,465 37,199 30.8%
Somalia 2,245 61 1,092 2,179 3,263 5,644 12,240 7,281 2,327 36,332 65.7%
Mali 125 1 2,393 218 1,675 9,314 5,610 10,010 5,526 34,872 38.3%
Bangladesh 157 12 1,279 622 323 4,358 4,953 8,131 8,687 28,522 10.5%
Senegal 11 0 448 48 1,314 4,652 5,705 10,327 5,366 27,871 25.8%
Côte d’Ivoire 126 16 1,232 8 93 1,484 3,641 12,396 7,905 26,901 30.2%
Others  2,665 3,419 21,692 5,219 8,984 50,905 47,100 60,686 40,039 240,709 31.4%
Total 9,573 4,406 62,692 13,267 42,925 170,099 153,844 181,436 99,742 737,984
Estimated % refugees 36.8% 31.1% 21.7% 40.0% 62.2% 62.8% 49.5% 35.9% 31.6% 44.5%
           Source:    Arrivals: Italian Police, 2017; Proportion of positive decisions on asylum: Eurostat, 2017.
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